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Intro ducti on and Summary

This paper explo res the conse quenc es of curre ncy incon
verti bility for
excha nge rate and balan ce of payme nts polic ies.

It can be said that, in

the same way that the theor y of trade restr ictio ns
has not been as fully

worked out as the theor y of "free " inter natio nal trade
, the theor y of
excha nge rate behav ior with incon verti bility has not
been given the sarae
atten tion as the theory of "free ly" flexi ble excha nge
rates .

The two

proble ms are indeed quite simil ar since the respo nsibi
lity to conve rt the
natio nal curren cy into foreig n excha nge is a restr ictio
n on inter natio nal
trade in much the same way as a direc t trade restr ictio
n.

Furth ermor e,

curre ncy incon verti bility also has a restr ictiv e impac
t en trade in asset s,

which is not the case for direc t trade restr ictio ns. In
fact, the meani ng
of conv ertib ility in the IMF Artic les of Agree ment is
confi ned to "rest rictio ns
on the ~akin g of payme nts and trans fers for curre nt inter
natio nal trans actio ns"
(Art. VIII, Sectio n 2) and to date, only 46 of the 134 membe
r coun tries have
accep ted to refra in from impos ing such restr ictio ns
and still preva il
thems elves of the trans ition al statu s allow ed by Artic
le XIV. 1
l

Accep tance

See Annua l Repor t 1978. p. 109 and Annua l Repor t on Excha
nge Restr iction s,
The count ries inclu de Weste rn Europ e, the Middl e East
and most of
Latin Amer ica.

P• 422-426.
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of the Ar tic le VII I obl iga tio ns,
how eve r, doe s not imp ly tha t the
cou ntry
can not dir ect ly res tric t trad e
sin ce the res tric tio ns are onl
y lift ed for
. d
aut 1or
I 1ze
cur ren t acc oun t tra nsa ctio
. ns. 1
The dev elo pm ent of pri vat e int
ern atio nal fin anc ial inte rme dia
tion has
led to an unp rec ede nte d gro wth
of trad e in ass ets tak ing pla ce
not onl y
amo ngs t ind ust ria lize d cou ntr ies
but als o spr ead ing to sem i-in
dus tria lize d
and eve n some les s dev elo ped cou
ntr ies . Thi s com bin atio n has
pro vid ed
inc ent ive s for ind ivid ual s usi
ng an inc onv erti ble cur ren cy in
dom esti c
tra nsa ctio ns to atte mp t at bui
ldin g up for eig n exc han ge bal anc
es, so tha t
the y can div ers ify the ir por tfo
lio s acr oss ass ets den omi nate d
in dif fer ent
cur ren cie s. In res pon se, many
gov ern men ts hav e atte mp ted to
rec apt ure
for eig n exc han ge by off erin g spe
cia l adv ant age s to cer tai ~ typ
es of tra ns
act ion s, nam ely the one s whe re
eva sio n of exc han ge con tro ls wou
ld be eas ier 1
lik e to~ ris t ser vic es and mig
ran t's rem itta nce s. Ne ver the les
s, in many
cou ntr ies wit h inc onv erti ble cur
ren cie s, "bl ack " ma rke ts for for
eig n
exc han ge hav e dev elo ped to the
poi nt tha t the rel ati ve pri ce
betw een dom esti c
and for eig n money tha t is det erm
ine d in the se ma rke ts can pro vid
e rele van t
info rma t.io n abo ut the bal anc e
of pay men ts pro blem of the cou
ntry in que stio n.
The imp orta nce of ille gal tra nsa
ctio ns in int ern atio nal trad e
and pay men ts
is of cou rse not new . The Ita
lia n crim ino log ist Bec car ia wro
te a con diti on
for pro fita ble smu ggl ing at abo
ut the same tim e as Hume wro te
abo ut the spe cie
.
2
fl ow mec hanis m.
Even thouP,h
Bec car ia's con cer n was the com
par ison betw een
los t gov ern men t rev enu e from the
tar iff and inc rea sed cos t of sup
erv isio n,
it can be ada pte d to an inc onv
erti ble cur ren cy sys tem by say
ing tha t smu ggl ing
1
See Mik ese ll (1947) for an ear
ly dis cus sio n of the rel atio n
and exc han ge res tric tio ns.
betw een trad e

2

The work is quo ted and dis cus sed
in Bha gwa ti-H ans en (19 73) , foo
tno te 1.
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is profitable when the black market premium is lower than the tariff.Desp ite
these ancient analytic origins and the apparent spread of the phenomenon,
smuggling and related features of internation al trade was only recently
analyzed from a welfare viewpoint in the framework of .the conventiona l
2x2x2 trade model.

Empirical work on the subject by Cooper pointed out

the positive relationshi p between the amount of smuggling and the level of
the tariff, 1 whereas the literature on the detection of smuggling has pointed
out methods to use partner country data to detect underinvoic ing of exports
or of imports, capital flight, etc, 2 t0get;1er with analyzing some of the cvnsequences •:in the balance of .t'ayments. 3
The literature on black markets ewerged in the late 40's in the context
of the effects of price controls.

Using the conventiona l graphics of demand

and suppl~ Boulding pointed to the possibility that the black market price
could be below the equilibriu~ price, namely when penalties are mostly directed
4
to buyers.
An analysis of the black market for foreign exchange linking the early
contributio ns to the illegal transaction s literature referred to above was
recently carried out by Sheikh (1976) whereas black market rates have been
used by Blejer

(1978) in monetarist models of exchange rate determinati on

and by Giddy (1978) in Box-Jenkins efficiency tests.
There has, therefore, been no attempt to explicitly apply the "modern"
theory of exchange rate determinati on emphasizing the importance of asset

1

See Coo~er

(1974)

2 see

Morgenstern (1950), Bhagwati (1964) and (1967) and Bhagwati
Krue ;er-·.Jihuls,,• aski
(1Q74).
3 see
4

Bhagwati (1967)

See Boulding (1947).

Another useful reference is Michaely (1954).
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markets to inconve rtible currenc ies. 5

Even the monumen tal work on trade

and exchange liberali zation directed by Bhagwat i (1978) and Krueger (1978)
implici tly take the traditio nal view of exchange rate determi nation by the
equality of flow supply and demand for foreign exchange either in the officia l
or in the bla.ck market.

In this paper a stock view of the determi nation of

the black market exchange rate is linked tu a flow view of the officia l rate
u~der variou~ official exchan~e rate regimes.
The paper is organize d into three Sections and two Appendi ces.

After

a brief review of the black market literatu re in Section 1, the analysis

proceeds from a simple dynamic partial equilibr ium model of the two markets
in Section 2 to a general equilibr ium model of the determi nation of the
two rates and a brief conclusi on in Section 3.

Appendix 1 derives the

stahilit y conditio n of the partial equilibr ium model in terms of the supply
and demand of exports and imports and Appendix 2 extends the results of the
several equilibr ium model to an economy with non-trad ed goods.

5

some of the recent literatu re on dual exchange rates has emphasiz ed
asset markets but ignores the linkages between the two markets . See Flood
(1978). The linkage was consider ed by Fleming (1968) and (1Gi4), but taking
current accounts as given. Other useful referenc es are Lanyi (1975) and
Swohoda (1074).
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I.

Black markets for foreign exchang e:
approac hes.

1.

The graphic analysis of the black market for foreign exchange is

the traditio nal and m:>netar ist

essenti ally based on the "textboo k" or BRM view of the foreign exchange
market first advanced by Bickerd icke (1920), Robinson (1937), Metzler (1949),
and Machlup (1949) where the exchange rate equates flow supply and flow
demand for foreign exchan~e and such schedule s are derived from the demand
.and supply of exports and imports respecti vely together with the Boulding

(1947) and Michaely (1954) analysis of black markets.
In Figure 1 Sand D represe nt respecti vely unrestri cted flow supply
and demand of funds to the foreign exchang e market and their intersec tion E
-determi nes the unrestri cted equilibr ium price of foreign currency in terms
of uumesti c currency .

If the officia l price is set at E

0

<Ethe authori ties

would have to sell foreign exchang e at the rate tFG per unit of time.

If

t h ey d o not, exporter s wou ld rese 11 Ox int
.
h e bl ac k mar k et at price
·
E.max 1'f
O
the threat of penaltie s is ignored . Penaltie s on sellers would shift S to
S 1 and on buyers would shift D to D' thus establis hing a rate
that E <E'<E.
0

b

Eb

such

The quantity bought and sold in the black market i s ~ •

more than in the earlier situatio n because of the new supply of funds but
less than in the unrestri cted case.
It is of course unlikely that the shift from officia l supply to black
market supply would occur only for the foreign exchange supplied at a
price higher than E .
0

Boulding thus discusse d the "encroac hment" of the black

market or the official market which would lead to the supply schedule like
S"S'.
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FIGURE 1

BOULDING'S BLACK MARKET
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This analysis and the conclusi on that E~<E--w as challeng ed by Michael y
who based the supply and demand of black market foreign exchange on the
decreas ing availab ility of officia l supply as the black market premium
increas es, which, for neutral rationin g of officia l demand, will imply that
the demand for foreign exchange is positive in a range and therefor e that
the black market price is higher than the equilibr ium price.

In Figure 2

the supply of foreign exchange to the black market Es" is the horizon tal
0
differen ce between a downward sloping availab ility curve AX and the Boulding
supply XS'.

The demand curve DD" is the differen ce between the rationed

demand curved AX and the Boulding demand DD'.

It is upward sloping

initiall y because of the dominan ce of the effect of the decrease d supply.
Keeping essenti ally the same framewo rk, Sheikh (1976) has shown that with
perfect resaling for officia l foreign exchange E~ = E, which was only a
limiting case in the analysi s of Michael y.

Even though Sheikh's analysis

is carried out for the foreign exchange market, by incorpo rating a demand
for capital flows independ ent of the exchange rate it reveals the limitati on
of the flew approach to exchange rate detennin ation more than it adds to
the early contribu tion. 1
2.

Another strand in the black market litera.tu re is basicall y empirica l

and of monetar ist persuas ion.

1 other referenc es
can be found in Michaely (1954). In minor points,
namely the rationin g of officia l funds, Sheikh (1976) follows Brofenb renner
(1947). Giddy (1~7o) links an analysis of Culberts on (1975) based on resale
of foreign e:,,:c'-'.~~c "tdth no effect of rlemand to the supply side of the no
resale analysis of Sheikh (1,76).
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FIGURE 2

MICHAELY'S BLACK MARKET
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The basic referenc e is the model of Blejer (1Q78a) who has adapted
his work on the 11X>netary approach to the Mexican balance of payments
(1977a) to derive a PPP-mon etarist model explaini ng the black market rate. 1
Denoting proporti onal rates of change by

we can write his iooney

market equilibr ium conditio n as

(1)

where

a+ (1- y) R + yD

c

P + md

y

=

D/ (D+R)

D

...

domestic monetary base

R

=

foreign monetary base

a

=

money multipl ier

p

C

domestic price level

md

=

real demand for money

1
_ other referenc e$ are Culberts on (1975) who simply used annual data
on black market rates in India, Phillipi nes and Turkey for PPP calcula tions,
Giddy (1978) who attempte d to show the "efficie ncy" of black markets for
foreign exchange in Colombi a, Brazil and Israel by testing the randomn ess
of the black market premiums and changes in the premium using weekly
data and Blejer (1978b) who used annual data on a black market based
real exchange rate for Brazil, Chile and Colombi a to estimate money
demand function s in these countrie s.
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Dome stic infla tion is a weigh ted avera ge of chang
es in trade d and non
trade d goods price s, the latte r berin g the world
price level plus the chang e
in the offic ial rate
(2)

where

p =

BP*+ Be+ (1-8)

PNT

P*

= the world price level

e

= the offic ial rate of excha nge

PNT

= the price of

non-t raded goods

He defin es chang es in mone tary diseq uilib rium o"
as the perce ntage gap betwe en
ex-an te chang es in suppl y (incl uding the mult iplie
r) and chang es in nomi nal
demand for money or
~

(3)

o

=

yD + a - (Md+P)

The reaso ning being that only D --and presu mabl
y a--ca n be contr olled by
the auth oriti es in a small open econo my unde r
fixed rates .
Chan ges in the price of non-t raded goods are given
by the assum ption
that relat ive price s have an elas ticit y

1 In

with respe ct to nomi nal mone tary

Bleje r (1977 c), relat ive price s leve ls depen ded
on O which led to
lagge d terms in (5) and was repla ced by a form
ulati on like (4) in (1978 a)
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Given the assump tions domest ic inflati on is a weighte d average of
world inflati on and real moneta ry disequ ilibriu m, the weight on the
latter
being zero if the share of expend iture on non-tra ded goods is zero

(5) P

=

where

1
e =--l+t.(1-S )-

epT + c1-e)(o +P)

The black market rate is modelle d by postula ting that the supply is
an
increa sing functio n of the premium and demand functio n of expecte d
inflati ons
at home and abroad as proxies for the nomina l intere st rate.

The expecte d

rate change in the real black market rate is a negativ e fur.ctio n of
the log
of the actual value.

]

(6)

log SB = cl + a log p

(7)

log DB= c

(8)

dlog r

where

and

p

=

r

=

E

2 + b dlog r

E

= -log r

e/e

eP*
p

is the black market premium e being the black market rate
is the real exchang e rate

E denotes expect ation

Substi tuting for the expecte d change in the real rate and making flow
supply equal to flow demand we have
(9)

e

1

a+b [a~

= - -

+

b (P-P*)]

but from (5) we can elimina te P and we have
!under ration al expect ations the real exchang e rate will be given_b
y
rt= exp(ex p(-t)) where r(O)=l . This imolie s a maximum devalu ation
~ftPY rho. initial
moment , apprec iating gradua lly to 1.
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(10)

e

+ b(l-0 )

=

a+b

(c

+ p _ P*)

Final ly Bleje r assum es a PPP react ion funct ion fore
and finds
(11)

where
and

x

iJJ

e

=

ljJX

= yD + a -(md + P*)
= (aa+b ) (1-e)

(a+b) (1-Sa)

That is to say that the black marke t rate only depen
ds on the "gap" ,
measu ring nomin al money demand in foreig n price s.
large r the black excha nge rate depre ciate s.
by

If credi t creat ion is

Using real money demand

fitted /a regre ssion on perma nent incom e and an adapt
ive expec ted dome stic
infla tion varia ble, Bleje r const ructs his indep enden
t varia ble x, runs the
regre ssion

and repor ts that a + a ~ 1 for the three count ries
analy zed.
1
2
The ad hoc natur e of the whole exerc ise and the weak
natur e of the test
are appar ent.

The impli cation of an equat ion like (11) is, assum ing
comp lete

steri lizat ion of,th e chang es in
the offic ial rate,
eBt
]!_ ~
(13)
e = iJt--if"
+ a e
where Bt is the balan ce of payme nts.

There is no reaso n, howev er, to expec t that the black marke
t rate is
relate d to the chang es in the foreig n excha nge reserv es of
the centr al bank,
FG as a propo rtion of the money suppl y. If there were no
capit al movements
Bt would be the curre nt accou nt. In a 100 per cent money
regim e eFG c M
and if relati ve PPP holds for the offic ial rate a• 1 and
~c 1 there fore
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establishing that the black market premium increases as central bank
reserves decrease.

Now given the assumptions about the black market

in (6-8) and reversing the causation, we can see that changes in

expected real exchange rate determine changes in the stock of foreign
assets of the central bank
(14)

where

h = a/b

but this raises the question of whether the appropriate exchange rate to
use in the computation of r should be the black market rate.
In short,Blejer's

1

adaptations of the PPP-monetarist model suffer

not only from the general inadequacies of the approach but also from
an ad-hoc formulation of the black market which leads to a relationship
that presumes the absence of controls and intervention since it implicitly
identifies the foreign monetary base with the stock of foreign assets
held by the private sector, which is the relevant determinant of the black
market rate or of the black market premium, depending on the relative
size of the black market.
We now turn to a more promising approach to exchange rate determination
than the one underlying Blejer's construct.

1using annual data over a sufficiently long range it is quite plausible
that the current account should respond to the official real rate. But there
is no monetary assumption whatsoever behind such an equation.

-14-

II.
1.

Exchange rates and the current accounts rmder inconvertibility.
We will first review briefly the theory of exchange rate determination

which views the decisions of domestic and foreign residents about the com
position of their portfolios as the primary determinants of exchange rates
in the short run, given expectations about the fundamental determinants of
the long run equilibrium value of the exchange rate.

The portfolio approach to exchange rate determination stems from the
general equilibrium approach to monetary theory advanced by Tobin (1969)
and explored in Branson (1976).

Kouri (1975) has shown that the essential

features of the portfolio approach are captured by a model where residents
only hold two assets, domestic and foreign money, whereas foreigners do
not hold domestic currency.

This assumption is retained in Calvo and

Rodriguez (1976) who call it "currency substitution" and it allows an
immediate statement of the relationship between the exchange rate and
the current account as demonstrated in Kouri (1976b), Rodriguez (1978)
and Dornbusch-Fischer (1978).

If, following Kouri (1978), we assume that there is no inflation,
no real growth and no systematic intervention on the part of the central
bank and if asset demand functions are homogeneous in wealth the short

run equilibrium condition in the foreign exchange market is
eF

(1)

where

n

=

=

a (1r)W

(e/e)E

and a 1 >0

W = financial wealth in domestic currency.

-15-

The stock of foreig n assets held by the privat e sector change
s with
the curren t accoun t B
(2)
where

t =

B(e, y)

Bis the curren t accoun t surplu s,
Yare other determ inants of the curren t accoun t

and

Be> 0 is the Marsh all-Le rner condi tion, which implie s a unique
e*

such that B=O.
The system is illust rated in Figure 3 for a given initia l
stock of
foreig n assets F •
0

On the right hand panel the tempo rary equili brium e

0

is illust rated on the inters ection of the e=aW/F curve, given
n and W,
and the initia l stock F .
0

The left hand panel depic ts the curren t accoun t

as a functi on of the exchan ge rate.

At rate e

there is a surplu s B
0
which leads to an increa se in the stock of foreig n assets
and an appre ciatio n
0

of e until lnng run equilib rium is reache d ate*, with B(e*)=
O and F=F*.

The effect of an increa se in the expect ed rate of depre ciatio
n will
be to shift up the FF schedu le to F'F' ,depre ciate the curren
cy back to
e

0

and equili brium will be restor ed ate* with stock of foreig
n assets

F'*·

An increa se in the domes tic demand for impor ts, on the other
hand

shifts BB up to B'B' so that the curren t accoun t is in defic
it and equili brium
is restor ed at exchan ge rate e

0

and stock of foreig n assets F

0

from the

-16-

FIGURE 3

INTERACTION BETWEEN THE CURRENT AND
CAPITAL ACCOUNTS: THE KOURI DIAGR AM
e

e*
B'

F'

-B

B

F'*

F
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1

initial e*, F*.
If there is inflatio n in the domesti c and foreign economi es at rates
TI

p

and TI* respect ively~h e long run value of the exchange rate will be
p

TI -TI*'
p p

By defining the real value of the stock of foreign assets held

by domestic residen ts as F =(F/P*) and the inflatio n adjusted current
.

account B=B/p*

-TI

p

*F which is an increasi ng function of the real exchange

rate e=eP*/P we can apply the earlier analysi s to the system

where

TI

is the expected rate of depreci ation of the real exchange rate,

and Wis real wealth.
Even though this general ization is useful for empiric al purpose s it
does not treat inflatio n adequate ly and in any case, does not handle
the case where there are new savings to be allocate d from real growth
in the two economi es.

In the analysis that follows , therefo re, we

continue to assume no inflatio n and no real growth.
l
For the effects of other disturba nces and the modific ations introduc ed
by assuming that expecta tions are rationa l rather than stationa ry, see
Kouri (1976a). The system can then be written as
eF =

a(e/e)W

F = B(e)

.

and steady- state equilibr ium, such that e/e = F = O, is a saddlep oint
as illustra ted below.

With initial stock F

0

the rate consiste nt with

rationa l expecta tions e O' is below the stationa ry expecta tions rate eo.
e

eo i---..._

-18-

2.

The foregoing analysis of the interaction of the current and capital

accounts can be modified to understand a regime of currency inconvertib ility.
The regime involves the prohibition of capital account transaction s in the
official market for foreign exchange, where the monetary authorities use a
mixture of interventio n and exchange rate adjustment in order to balance the
reported current account.

Exporters have an incentive to under-invoi ce and

the "subsidy" implied by the difference between the premium and the reported
export subsidy increases supply of exports together with the supply of for
eign exchange to the "free" market.

Residents do not consume exports and the

effects of the subsidies on consumption are ignored in this partial equilib
rium framework with no cross-price effects between goods.
Importers will purchase funds from the black market to acquire un
authorized goods and services insofar as the tariff or equivalent is less
than the black market premium, given the foreign price.

The absence of

import substitutes is also assumed.
Equilibrium in the black market is exactly the same as in the Kouri
analysis just described.

The difference is now that the underinvoic ing of

exports and the acquisition of unauthorize d imports provides a link between
the official and the black market but there remain two markets, one with a
flow equilibrium and the other with a stock equilibrium .
Under plausible conditions 1 the domestic currency value of reported
exports, X, will increase with a devaluation of the official rate, or an
r
increase in the export subsidy, whereas it will decrease with a depreciatio n
of the black market rate.

1 set
framework.

Conversely, the foreign currency value of reported

out in Appendix 1, using the popular Bickerdicke -Robinson-M etzler

* will decrease with a devaluation of the official
imports, M,
rate or an
r
increase in the import tariff or quota, whereas it will increase with a
depreciation of the black market rate.

Ignoring the tariff and the sub-

sidy, the reported current account measured in foreign currency, B , can
r
thus be written as

(3)

B

= X

r

ax r

where

ae

e)/e r (e'

*r

M

*r

axr >

3M

ae

ae

<0; - - < O;

(e, e)

>O;

3M *
r

< 0

ae

The effect of a depreciation of the black market rate on the reported
current account is clearly nerative, since

aB r

(4)

=

ae

and

X

nr = -

1 (
e

X

r

e
M

X

nr

+

A* A

r - ' nr = Mr le

X ;;.

*

M

M)

r nr

as assumed.

The effect of a devaluation of the official rate on the reported current
account is, however, ambiguous.

clB

(5)

X

r

=

e e

ae

and

_x

1 [-2

A

(fix - 1)

r

A*

In fact

_MM*]
+ nr
r

iiM
nr = Xr le·' r = - Mr /e as above.

The exp ress ion in squ are bra cke ts
is the Mar shal l-Le rner con diti on,
so tha t, for ini tial equ ilib rium ,
a pos itiv e effe ct of the dev alua tion
wil l
req uire tha t the exch ange rate ela
stic ity of the repo rted exp orts in
dom esti c
curr enc y and the repo rted imp orts
in fore ign curr enc y be gre ater than
one .
The ana lysi s for the unre port ed cur
ren t acco unt, mea sure d in fore ign
curr enc y B , is alon g the same line
s. Thu s
u

(6)

B

u
ax

whe re

u

(e, e)/e - M* (e, e)
u

>

O;

= X

u

ae

ax

u

<

a.M *
u

O;

ae

ae

<

O;

aM *
u

> 0

a~

aB

(7)

u ~- 1 ( Xu _x
*
nu + MU 1'm)
u
a~
~
e
aB

( 8)

u

ae
The con diti on for

aB

u

i ae

>

>

0 bein g with ini tial equ ilib rium

1

Assu min g tha t the Mar shal l-Le rner
con diti on does hold in both cas es,
we
can wri te our syst em as

(9)

eF = aw

-· 1 _
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(10)

B

u

+
(e,

e)

0

= F

(11)

Equations (9), (10) and (11) provide a description of the interaction
between the two markets.

If the official rate is freely floating to balance

the reported current account the description is complete.

If the official

rate is pegged, the consequences of a decrease in central bank reserves have
to be spelled out by incorporating the money supply process.

We assume for

the moment that it is constant and therefore that domestic credit compensates
for a decline in the foreign money base.
are the mixed regimes.

Between these two polar cases there

We will concentrate first on regimes where the monetary

authorities set the official rate based on central bank reserves, or alter
natively where the rate of crawl depends on the current account. 1
The nature of the interaction between the two markets is apparent in
Figure 4 where an initial situation of equilibrium is assumed.
panel we have, as before, temporary equilibrium ate
assets F.
0

0

In the right

with stock of foreign

In the left panel, the reported current account is shown as an

increasing function of the official rate, whereas the unreported current account
is a decreasing function of the official rate.

Defining the black market rate

in such a way as to incorporate a constant risk premium (or for that matter a
given export subsidy or import tariff), the equilibrium of the two markets
obtains at rate e

0

=

e.
0

Now consider that the desired stock increases, say

because a political crisis brings about an expected depreciation of the domestic currency.
1

The FF schedule shifts up to F'F', the black market rate in-

In Section 3 we analyze the implications of an exogenous rate of crawl,
where the official exchange rate devalues in steady-state.
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creases toe' and this deteriorates the reported current account to B'B' whereas
r r
increasing the stock of foreign
the unreported current account increases to B'B'
u u
assets to

Fi

mained ate

0

and pushing down toe toe".

The official rate, however, has re-

and the deficit on the reported current must be financed either by

the sale of foreign assets by the central bank 6FG, or by an increase in the export subsidy or the tariff, or by devaluation of the official rate 6

e.

With

no exogeneus increase in the risk premium, the latter three cases would decrease
the profit from using the black market and funds would shift out until the two
rates would again be equal toe'=

e'.

The first case could imply an exhaustion

of reserves, with a large initial stock, ignoring expectations,

1

a continuing

premium would pull resources to the black market and could therefore bring
equilibrium back toe 0 =

e.
0

Consider now the steady-state properties of this model more explicitly
in Figure 5.

On the right panel we have portfolio balance as before.

the left panel we draw in e,

On

e space the loci along with the reported and

unreported current account are zero.

To the left of the B_ = 0 locus the
L

official current account is in deficit and to the right it is in surplus.
To the left of the B = 0, the unofficial current account is in surplus and
u
to the right it is in deficit.

1

A similar model with expectations was used to analyze foreign exchange
crises of this type by Krugman (1°7~).
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FIGURE 4

TEMPORARY EQUILIBRIUM WI TH INCONVE
RTIBILITY

e

8'u

e

8'r

F

F'

F'

F

FIGURE 5

STEADY STATE EQUILIBRIUM WI TH INCON
VERTIBILITY
Br=O

e j

e

r
e•

..J
~·

e

e
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The slopes of the two loci can be written as
de

B

r - 0

B
u

C

0

3B/oe

--=---de
. 3B r /ae

aB u /ae

de

de

-

0::

-

3B /'oe
u

If the reported current ac:ount responds 100re to the official rate
and the unreported current account responds more to the black market rate
than they respond to the other rate, then the slope of the B = 0 locus,
r
which has the "own" effect on the numerator will 1::e larger.
Suppose that the official rate is devalued.

This leads to an un-

reported deficit and a decreaee in the stock of foreign assets held by the
public which will push up the black market rate.

Conversely for an un

anticipated revaluation of the official rate (see vertical arrows in the
left panel of figure 5).

On

the other hand, a decrease in the stock of

foreign assets of the central bank m:>tivated by an increase in the black
market rate leads to a devaluation of the official rate (horizontal arrows).

If the slope of the Br schedule is lower than the slope of the Bu
schedule, then there will be situations where the unofficial current
account is in deficit and the official rate is increasing, which increases
the deficit, whereas the reported current account surplus also increases.
Then the two rates depreciate without limit.

-?.5-

The steady-state adjustments to an increase in the demand for foreign
assets after the initial deJ-reciation to e' is to put the official current
account in deficit and the unofficial current account in surplus.

As the

stock of private foreign assets increases the free market rate appreciates
and returns to its original value.

With our intervention assumption the

decline in the stock of forei~ assets of the central bank would lead to
a depreciation of the official rate and therefore to a path like I ra·ther
The new equilibrium stock of foreign assets would be F'* and the

than P.

two rates would remain e* and e*.
Therefore while the initial stock of foreign assets determines the
free rate at each instant, steady-state equilibrium is determined by trade
in goods, namely the combination of the two rates that keeps official and
unofficial current accounts in balance.

That the capital account matters

in the short run and the current account in the long run is a conclusion
of models of this type under stationary expectations.

How long is the long

run furthermore depends on the relative magnitudes cf
. 1 accounts. 1
capita

1

See Kouri (1978) p. 27ss. If the stock of foreign assets is half
of the current account, 90% of the deviation from long run equilibrium is
eliminated in 1.2 years.
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3.

We continue to focus on exchange rate regimes where there is

a mixture of central bank interven tion and exchange rate adjustm ent, like
a crawling peg b~sed on the state of the current account, which is just
a continuo us version of the followin g reaction function

e

(12)

G
= g (F )

g' < 0

since it implies by differen tiation that
B

e

(13)

-

C:

r
FG

y-

-

e

G

where

y = - F g'/g

The rate of crawl is a fraction

y of the ratio of the current account to

the stock of reserves of the central bank.
hypothe sis,"

In this case,Ko uri's "accele ration

accordin g to which the domestic currency apprecia tes when

the current account is in surplus and deprecia tes when it is in deficit, is
the result of central bank policy.
In the black market, though, the "accele ration hypothe sis" is
the result of particip ant's behavio r.

In fact, differen tiating (9)

holding a and Wconsta nt and substitu ting (11) we get
B

0

(14)

e
e

u

C:

F
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The dire ction of the arrow s in the left pane l
of figu re 5 follo ws
by diffe rent iatin g (13) with resp ect toe and
(14) with resp ect toe. Thus
an incre ase in the blac k mark et (off icial ) rate
push es the offi cial (blac k
mark et) rate up

aB

ai
_..,

- r aer
ae

ae
-=
ae

a

u

-

>

o

> 0

The syste m desc ribed by (13) and (14) has a line
ar appr oxim ation
aroun d the stea dy-s tate valu es e* and e* such
that B "'B "'O.
r
u
(4), (5), (7) and (8) the syste m can be writ ten
as

e

M*/F
u

0

-

(11

X

u

+

11

M

- 1)

u

Usin g

p (fix + f'iM)
u
u

- e*

(15)

.

LeJ

In

LV

vM*
· r I

;c J

-1 , X .
p
l 11 + n M)
r
r
I-

V

<ii; +

..

_M

nr -

l)Jt

Given that the Mars hall- Lern er cond ition s hold
, the trace cond ition is
obvi ously met. For the deter mina nt to be posi
tive, howe ver, we need a
stron ger cond ition , name ly for the stren gth of
the "own" effe cts to be
such that the prod uct of thei r diffe renc e over
one is larg er than
the prod uct of the "cro ss" effe cts.

I

e*J

Note that this conditio n carries over to a model where wealth is
composed of foreign money and domestic money divided as

(16)

eF = b(1r)H

where

b = a/1 - a

and

H = (1-a)W
Conside r now, even though it is not necessar y for the analysi s, that

we are in a pure gold standard system, in that there is no domestic base
money.

Their (11) above gives the increase in the money supply, and, assuming

that capital gains and losses of the central bank due to changes in the
officia l rate are not a source of new money, we can write

(17)

.

H • eB

r

By differen tiating the portfoli o balance conditio n and substitu ting
from (10) and (16) we find the equation of notion for the black market rate:
eB

(18)

F

- --u
F

From (12) we have the equation of notion for the officia l rate:

.

e-= g'B r

.

The slope of thee= 0 locus is thus the same as before, whereas the
slope of the~= 0 locus becomes

de
de

Ie =

e3Br/oe - M 3Bu/ae
- -e-~B_/_a_e___M_a_B.c;._/a_e_ _ _ _ >

r

O

u

But the conditi on for the slope of the

l

= 0

locus to be larger

than the slope of thee~ 0 locus, as in the left panel of Figure 5 above·1
,
is the same, namely the dominance of the "own" effects

aB

(19)

ae

u

aB

r

ae

3B
>

u

oB

r

----

ae

ae

The linear approx imation around equilib rium confirm s that the trace
conditi on is met and that the determ inant will be positiv e if (19) holds.
4.

In terms of the underly ing elastic ities of supply of exports and

demand for import s, in the small country case where demand for exports
and
supply for imports are infinit ely elastic and initial equilib rium obtain
s,
the conditi on on the determ inant in (15) simpli fies consid erably.

In

fact the determ inant will be positiv e provide d that the sum of the premium
elastic ities of the supply of exports and demand for imports be smalle
r than

l

Since the money supply is continu ously changin g, the right panel
is less useful for the analys is.
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the sum of the premium elasticitie s of their respective reported shares. 1
As one would expect, if the two market shares change sufficientl y, the system
will be dynamically stable.
The result hinges of course on the particular form of setting the
official exchange rate.

If

e

were pegged, the analysis would not be

informative because the monetary consequence s of the loss in reserves
cannot be tracked down in a partial equilibrium framework.
for an exogenous rate of crawl

,,

Similarly,

which would make the present system

unstable.
Before proceeding to a more general analysis, it is worth emphasizing
the main feature, of the inconvertib le currency system described above.
It is that, even though the combination of the Marshall-Le rner condition
and of the acceleratio n hypothesis underlying the government' s behavior
is not sufficient for stability, as it would be in a unified regime with
stationary expectation s, it is sufficient that the response of the official
market shares to the incentive provided by the black market premium be larger
than the responses of supply and demand.

If the latter are zero, the stability

requirement s are the exact analog of a unified regime.

1

See Appendix 1.
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III.

Currency Inconvertibilit y, Money and Relative Prices
1.

In the preceding section we presented a condition for

the

stability of a black market system which carried over to a simple gold stan
dard general equilibrium mo,iel.
We now bring, in the spirit of Kouri (1975), the wealth effects on
consumption into the picture, together with a more satisfactory money supply
process.

This will allow us to analyze the case where the official exchange

rate is changed by an exogenous crawling peg, a limiting case of which is
the fixed rate system.
Consider an economy where two traded goods are produced and consumed l
One of them is traded through the official forei~ exchang~ market and
the other is traded through the black market.

We are thus aggregating imports

and exports channeled through each one of the markets.
of the two goods is given and we can therefore take

The foreign price
e

as being the price

of the good traded through the official market and e as being the price
of the good traded th:rottgh the black m~rket.

The bla~k market premium f~ thus

the relative price of the two goods.
Assuming full employment of the factors of production, we can write
the supply function of the two goods as depending only on that relative price

1 The implications
of the existence of nontraded goods are analyzed
in Appendix 2.
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1)

+
X., X (p)

2)

X = X (p)

where Xis the output of the good traded through the blacy market
Xis the output of the good traded throu~h the official market
Domestic consumption depends on prices, income and wealth

+ + +
(P,

3)

C

4)

C., C (P, P, Y, W)

a::

C

P, Y, W)

+ :; + +

Y = XP + XP

where

These functions are homogeneous of degree zero in prices and income.
The properties holJ for/the excess supply functions, which are just the
reported and unreported current accounts: 1
1

The effect of a change in relative prices in the demand functions
can be given a sign because the income effect is cancelled out. In fact
differentiating (3) with respect to P, we have
dC = lf_

dP

aP

+~
aY

X

+~
oY

(dX

p

+

dX)

The term in parenthesis vanishes by the assumption that we are on
the transformation curve and therefore the marginal rate of substitution in
production is equal to the price ratio. Now since the Slutsky decomposition
of the price effect is

ac. ac I-_ ac x
aP

aP

u

ay

we have the total effect being negative, like the compensated effect.
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0

5)

X - C -= B (p, W/e) = F

6)

X - C= B

u

OG

r (p, W/€) '"'F

Wealt h is composed of two asset s, domes tic money Mand
foreig n 100ney
F.

The asset demand funct ions depend on the relati ve retur
ns, on goods
price s and on wealt h.

__,-----'-

(1)

Md-= M (

(8)

eF

(9)

W= M

d

= F

+

1T'

+ + +
e, e, W)

~.

--~-

+ + + +
( ,r'

e,

W)

eF

Relat ive return s are captu red by the expec ted chang e in
the bla_ck
marke t excha nge rate. 1

1 rf the
share of expen diture on the offic ial trade d good is a,
a price index for a Cobb- Dougl as utilit y ftmct ion will
be
a
I e 1-a so that the real return on domes tic money is -ae
- (1 -a)e. The
real retur n on foreig n money is the chang e in e/ea e 1-aor
-ap. The differ ence
...
is there fore e.
A
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We now define the assets in terms of the official rate and assume
continuous portfolio balance:
9)

W.,. M + pF

where W = W/e
M = M/e

10)
11)

+ +
h (;, p, W)
+
+ +p, W)
pF=f(n,

M =

We eliminate (11) by the wealth constraint and write the protfolio
balance condition as
+ + - +
12) pF = f(n, p, M + pF)
We now specify the money stock as
13)

- G

M =CT+ eF

- K

where CT is total domestic credit K is the central banks net worth.
Even though changes in credit, in particular to the public sector,
are exogeneously given to the central bank, we can assume that there is
a part that is induced by the increases in net worth of the central bank
due to devaluations and

r~v::1l11::1t-inn nf gn1rL

This

il'l p.,,-H,. .. 1.,,-1y

case if the central bank is not independent of the government.

We thus

postulate that credit has an antonomous and an induced component or

C'> 0

The change in Kin turn can be written as

the
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whe re

G is the gold stoc k• Pr, is the pric e
of gold and ♦ r. = Pr./Pr. is the perc enta
ge
diff eren ce betw een the mark et pric e of
gold in fore i:?n curr ency and the
offi cial pric e . 1
Thus the chan ge in the money stoc k expr
esse d in fore ign curr ency
is

15)

M = 6+ :S

r

.. ¢ (1 -

C' )M

is the indu ced cred it crea tion ;

whe re

K = K/e

C

=

ana

C/e
~

.

= e/e is cne exog enou s rate of
craw l.

2. The mod el con sist s ther efor e of the
por tfol io bala nce con ditio n (11) ,
whic h give n exp ecta tion s and asse t sup
plie s dete rmin es the temp orar y
2 '
equ ilibr ium valu e of the blac k mark et
prem ium , and of the dom estic money

1

Note that F'G =Fe + PGG whe re Fe are
the fore ign exch ange rese rves
2
In fact from (12) we get as a redu ced
form

+ + -

p = p (n, M, F)

the sign s of the par tial s are disc usse
d belo w.

supply equation given by (15) and of the unreported current account
equation given by (5); which together determine the dynamic adjustment to
steady-state equilibrium where the premium, and the stock of foreign
assets are constant and 100ney grows at rate

~-

Since (11) holds at all times we substitute for o and keep as state
variables Mand F.

The model can then be written in compact form as

-

(16a)

M

= o+

(16b)

F

+ tH,
= Bu (n,

B

~

+

(n, M, F) - ~(l - C') M
r

F)

The signs of the partials in (16) hinge on the assumption that

(17)

~= 1 -

where

an - t>O

a= pF/W
n is the weqlth elasticity of the demand for foreign assets
€

is the premium elasticity of the denand for foreign assets

Even if n= 1, as is usually assumed in portfolio models, this
condition will be true if the stock of foreign assets is not too large a.pro
portion of wealth, as might be the case in an inconvertible currency
1 and the
regime,
premium elasticity is fairly small as well. Condition
1

Empirical evidence on these proportion for major currencies can
be found in Kouri-Macedo (1978) and Macedo (1979)
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(17) simply says that the valuation effect of a chanqe in the premium has
to dominate the relative price and the weighted wealth effect combined.
The effects of changes in asset supplies on the unreported current
Thus

account hinge on further restrictions.

(18)

1 -

> 0 if

£

= w

wa

n

where w. =
l.

ioB /ai i • p, Ware the positive semi-elasticities of the
u

unreported current account with respect to the premium and wealth
and
(19)

oBu

cF

a£
< 0 if

""w

-

1 -an

=w b
W

Note that, given (17)--which implies that a> b -- (19) is true if
(18) is true.

For an increase in the stock of foreign assets to deteriorate

the current account we thus need that the wealth effect be weaker than the
price effect on goods demands.

In that case

wp will be large and

ww

will be small, for given sizes of the price and wealth elasticities of
asset demands on the small size of which hinges the basic condition (17).
Defining as

w the

semi-elasticities for the reported current account, the

slope of the two loci along which

dM
dF

IB r

= 0

B
r

e

O and n • 0 are respectively
u

-3A-

The condition for the slope of the B • 0 locus to be larger than
u

the slope of the B
r

c

O locus reduces to

and we know that a> b from condition (17). 1
the system is indeed stable.

Under the conditions stated

Solving the crawling peg system around equi

librium we get
M - M*

(21)
-

(1 -na)

(w p - wwb)

The central role of condition (17) is again apparent.

F - F*

The trace condition

is met, under assumption (19). The condition on the determinant being
1
This shows, incidentally, the conditions under which the pegged official
exchange rate case is stable. Reverting to our l}asic model we confirm that
a positive rate of crawl lower the slope of the M-= 0 locus relative to the
slope of the Br

c

dM
dF

O locus.

I!

M-= 0

In fact:
p (1 -na)

•

all (

(w + ww

wp + ciiwa) +

ff F

b)

(1 - an- t)

positive is weakened relative to (20) because of the positive value of <f>. 1

.

!

3.

We depict the two loci where M • 0 and F • 0 in Figure 6, where

the arrows indicate the directions of motion.

..,•

Above the Mc O locus the

real money supply is decreasing and the reported current account is in
deficit for a given induced credit creation.

Above the

Fc

O locus the stock

of foreign assets is increasing and the tmreported current account is in
surplus.

Steady state equilibrium obtains at A.

If the official exchange

rate is pegged, the reported current account could have a deficit equal to
the credit creation induced by gold sales, since then the mney supply would
not be changing.
good economy.

However, at A,B

r

• 0 because B • 0 and we are in a two
u

In a crawling peg system the mney supply valued at the

official rate will converge to
0

M*., - - - - 
(1-c I)

<f>

so that the induced credit creation being non zero in the steady-state
is associated with the eontinuing devaluation of the official rate,
rate of which determines the growth in nominal mney and the black
market rate, when the reported and unreported current accounts are zero.
1 In fact when a<
b -and therefore~< 0 -- the determinant in (21)
reduces to the positive expression:

The trace condition, however, becomes stronger, namely
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The long run effects of an increase in the expected rate of
depreciation of the black market rate are also depicted in Figure 6.

At point

A there is now a deficit in the reported current account and a surplus on
0
the unreported current accotmt, so that the F = 0 schedule shifts to the

.

right and the M = 0

schedule shifts down.

At point A the real mo.ney
1

supply has decreased and the stock of foreign assets has increased.

A

devaluation of the official rate, by lowering the real stock of roney would
have the same qualitative effects.
The effects of various disturbances on the three endogenous
variables can be

ascertained by total differentiation of the system, to

yield

....
1 -

£ -

an

-n(l -a)

p

1- an

Tl lr
'TT

22)

00

M

!-

- w__ (l- a)_

w- w_..a
w

w·

L

F

J

0

I

Given condition (17) the determinant of the Jacobian in positive.

Note that the system can easily be reinterpreted for a pegged official
rate by making

♦

• 0 and introducing in the right hand side a column

identical to the first column of the Jacobian, without the
[l - e:- 1'l

•
•
-w-w

w

w-w

] I

w

a's, or
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Figure 6

Steady-Stat e Effect of an Expected Depreciatio n of the Black
Market Rate

M

=0

r
F

P"- .. --
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The results are collected in Table 1. 1

4.

The analysis in Figure 6 can be checked with reference to a

unified regime where the premium is always one and the two current accounts
can be aggregated, together with the stocks of foreign assets.

2

We are

basically back to a simple reneral equilibrium version of the partial equil
ibrium model reviewed in Section I.1, rewritten as

+

23)

F "" a(n)M/e

24)

~ •

D

+ B(M/e + F)

We represent in Figure 7 the steady state effects of an increase in
n

by a downward rotation of the upward slopping portfolio balance condition

inC23). The locus where 8 = 0 and hence B = 0 is downward slopping with

1

rn the devaluation case the effect on domestic money is ambiguous.
It will be negative if

1 - n
1 - an-£

2

wW(l-w) + wW(l-w)

Wif

+WW

w

·Another check is provided in Appendix 2 where the analysis is
extended to an economy with a non traded good.
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Table 1
Effect of Various Distureances

Effect on

p

'IT

+

0

+

e

+

M

F

+
+

+

+
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slope-1.

If the former contradicto ry efforts of non the two current accomits

offset each other the schedule keeps unchanged.

Then we see a decrease in

real balances from M to~ and an increase in foreign assets from F to F
0
0
1
as before. If the effect of an increase in n is to move the current accoi.mt
into surplus, as one would expect, then the schedule shifts to the right and
the increase in Fis larger (to F ) and the increase in real balances smaller
2
(to M2 ), than it would otherwise had been. In the perverse case where

-

the schedule shifts to the left (not shown) it is the increase in real
balances which is larger.
As we found in the partial equilibrium analysis in Section II, the
inconverti~ le currency regime had an analog with a unified floating regime,
when the supply and demand responses were small relative to the linkage
between the two markets.

Similarly, if the effects of the black market pre

mium or the current account are weak, the analysis can ignore the unreported
current account and the diff~rence between the stock of foreign assets of
the central bank and of

~h~

private ~Prtnr_

implication s of the analysis.

These are, of course, testable

If true, they would show that the portfolio

approach to exchange rate determinatio n in a regime of pure convertibil ity
is able to capture the essence of the problem even in a regime of inconverti
bility where the official foreign exchange market is controlled.
The main message

of the portfolio approach to exchange rate

determinati on mider currency convertibil ity is the acceleratio n hypothesis. 1
We hope to have shown that when the exchange rate policy of the central bank
involves continuous intervention s and controls in the foreign exchanges
this message remains.

1
(1979).

See some empirical evidence for major co1mtries in Kouri-Maced o
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Figure

7

Steady State Effect of an Expected Depreciatio n •f the Exchange
Rate in a Regime of ~ni~ie~ ~lost

M

e

PB
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Appendix 1
Derivatio n of the Stability Condition s in Terms of
of Demand and Supply for Imports and Exports

The argument in the text is based on the responsiv eness of the
reported and unreporte d trade flows to the official and black market
rates.

Introduci ng the markets for exports and imports gives, however,

further insights and, in fact, shows that, under plausible assumptio ns,
the determina nt of (15) in the text is positive and therefore that the
dynamic partial equilibriu m system is stable.
Equilibriu m in the market for the export good is character ized by

(1)

where

sx

is the supply of our exports

DX is

the demand for our exports

PX is the domestic currency price of exports
p * is the foreign currency price of exports and p •
X

e/e is the black

market premium and

(2)

where

I is the official exchange rate.
Equilibriu m in the market for the import goods, in turn, is, in

similar notation, character ized by:
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-,

.,.

I
"-

·.

and

The difference of equations (1) to (4) from the usual Bickerdicke 
Robinson-M etzler specificatio n is simply that the black market premium
is an argument in the export supply and import demand functions.

More

specificall y the assumption is that

(5)

aSx

> O

a-M

and _I_r

<

o

Aside from the supply and demand decision, the black market premium
has an effect in the decision about the share of exports and imports that
will go through the black market.

Institution al constraints clearly

prevent a "bang-bang" solution by which all exports would go though the
black market and all imports would go through the official market when
p > 1.

One way to incorporate these rigidities is to make the share of the

official market a function of the black market premium.

(6)

X* • a
r

(7)

M*

where

X *·• XP

r

- e

*

(p) X

*

(p) M

-*
X

Thus,

I'
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- m*
and M* • MP
The assumption is that

(8)

aa
aP

<

O and ~

> O

aP

More institution al features could be incorporate d without great gain
in insight.

Thus the existence of a subsidy on reported exports, S, and

of a tariff on reported imports, T, would make the profits from under
invoicing exports

(9)

nX

nx and imports~ like

- (P * , p, s)
= (e - es) [l - a(p,s)]P * X
·
X
X

(10)

where
T -

l + T

which would imply that profits would disappear when

(11)

a result in the spirit of Beccaria (1764-65) but which can also be found
in Winston's (1969) analysis of the overinvoici ng of imports in Pakistan.

Going back to the simipler model, we define the following positive
elasticities, using

E

11

hat 11 notation

....

X

,.
-= - Dx/P

E

X

M

• -

"M "'M

D /P

"M·,.
Ep •

-

D /P

.. X ...
Tlp • S /p

w

p

The logarithmic differentiation of (1) and (3) then yields

(12)
Tl

X

+

E

X

(13)

We now have, from (6) expressed in domestic currency

-so-

which, upon differentiation yields

(15)

X

•

r

e-

Valuing unreported exports at the black market rate we have,
similarly

Doing the same operations from (7) and substituting from (12)
and (13) respectively, we obtain the decomposition of the elasticities
mentioned in the text as

(17)

Tl

(18)

n

X

r =

M

··r

TlM ( 8P - £P) + 8P£M - Ep

•

TlM

+ Ep

(19)
£

(20)

(21)

X

+ Tl X

M nM(ep - Ep + £M) + (1 + ep) EH - Ep
Qr - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - TlM + £M
Tl

X

u

£x (1 + wp + np> + (1 + wp>nx - np
•
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(22)

(23)

(24)

Tl

M

u

-x

nu

-M
T\u

TIM (8P + cp) + ePcM + cp
•

TIM+ CM

-

cx<wp + Tlp - nx> + (1 + lllp) T\X - T\p

-

T\M (8P + £p - CM) + (1 + ep> CM+ cp

ex+ nx

-

CM+ TlM

With the exception of (22), the signs of all these elasticitie s are not
unambiguous ly positive, as they should be for the sip. assumption in the
text to be vindicated.
In order to concentrate on the differences with the usual decomposi
tion of the BRM elasticitie s, consider, however, the limiting use of a small
country which faces an infinitely elastic demand for its exports and
infinitely elastic supply of its imports.
remain are the factors of

Then the only expression which

ex and T\M.

Then assuming initial equilibrium , the sign presumption in the
text become

0

for

< 0

cle
clB
(26)

for

r

> 0

clB

(27)

(28)

C&i.P + eP + Tlp + cP > 0

~p

+ 8P +Tip+ cp

for

-cleu

-n -c >O for
X

X

>

clB

ai

u

0

<

0
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The source of the ambiguities is that there are two affects of an
increase in the premiums on the reported current account.

One is through

the change in the share, the other is through the change in the quantity.
The share elasticities are larger than the quantity elasticities.

If this

were not the case, the improvement in, say, the quantity exported brought
about by a devaluation of the official rate would be offset by the effect
of the decrease in the premium or

The deterioration of the reported current account from an increase
in the black market rate presumes, fur_ther, that the share elasticity
is larger than the supply elasticity or

For the unreported current account to deteriorate when the official
exchange rate is devalued, however, the condition is that the quantity
elasticities are overtaken by the direct effects of the decreased premium
which are then in the s ~ direction since both the share and the quantity
effect tend to deteriorate the unreported current account.

When the

former are absent as in the effect of the black market rate on the un
reported current account, there is no ambiguity, as equation (27) reveals.
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The stability condition of the a:>del becomes quite simple with a
bit of additional notation.

(31)

(32)

a •

.Cil..

.t'

+ 8p

- Tl p -

£

p

Thus the sum of the premium elasticities of the share of the un
reported current account is added to the sum of the premium elasticities
of supply and demand to form
Furthermore call

~

~

and these are subtracted to form

a.

the sum of the price elasticities

Then the determinant of the system described in the text becomes

(34)

- a
C1

which, going back to our earlier notation and expressing "'P and
terms of "'P and

ep

becomes:

(35)

which is always positive.

ep

in
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Appendix 2
A General Equilibriu m Model With Non-Trade d Goods

The model of Section III can be extended to include a non-trade d
good.

The importanc e of non-trade d goods goes back (at least!) to the Australia n

"dependen t economy" model exposited in Pearce (1961), was developed in Diaz
(1963) and related to the monetary approach to the balance of payments in
Dornbusch (1973) and Krueger (1974).

Kouri (1975) introduce d non-trade d

goods in the asset market view of the exchange rate.
This model has three goods and thus two relative prices.

Work with

three good models has been done by Jones (1974), Takayama (1974) and Dornbusch
(1975) and (1979).

If the price of the cross traded good is pNT, define

and the model in Section III becomes

.J:U.
.....

-

. +

"I"
(q,p,w)
• 0

1)

E

2)

pF • a(1r,q, p)M

3)

- +- M • 6 + Br(q,p,w)

++

equilibriu m ia the non-trade d goods market

+

portfolio balance (where the wealth elasticit y
is one for simplicit y)

- 1DOney supply process
and reported current

♦ (1-c')M

account

unreporte d current accotmt
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... -

Equations (1) and (2) define the temporary equilibrium .

Denoting by

semi-elasti cities of the excess demand for
•
non-traded goods with respect to

q, p and W and by Tll ,Tl and
2

the elasticitie s of the a ftmction with respect to q, p and
total

TIJ

l
11',

differentia tion of equations 1 and 2 yields

.

-£

- £(1-f)M - £fF

q

1

5)

-n 1

1 - Tl 2

The determinant

p

-

h • '1_(£ + cf) - £ (1 - Tl ) will be negative if the
2
1
2

relative price effects on the asset demand functions, captured by

Tl and
1
11 are small, the effect of the "own" price on the excess demand for non
2
1

traded goods is large relative to the effect of the prices of traded goods
(£

1

large and

£

2

small) and, the relative share of foreign assets in

wealth (f) is small.

Under that assumption we can write the reduced

forms for p and q as

+ + +

6)

q •q

(M,

1 Given

F , ,r)

a system of asset demands as in Section III, but with a
tmitary wealth elasticity, the a function is simply the ratio of the
demand for foreign assets fW and the demand for money (1-f)W.

.

We note that (7) has the same sign pattern as in the 11k>del of Section 3.
We give in•Figu re 8 a graphic al illustr ation of tempora ry equilib rium.
The slope of the locus where the non-tra ded goods marker is in equilib rium
is, from (1):

and is represe nted as the NT schedu le in Figure 8.

When the black market

premium increa ses, demand for the tmoffi cial traded good decreas es and
only an increas e in the relativ e price of the non-tra ded good will keep
the market in equilib rium,

The schedu le is shifted up by an increas e in

asset suppli es.
The slope of the portfo lio balance schedu le is, from (2):

which will be positiv e as well, unless the demand elastic ity is greate r
than the share of domest ic money in wealth . 1

We have assumed, howeve r,

that the valuati on effect of an increas e in p domina tes this direct demand
effect so that when the premium increas es and demand for forei~ assets
1since

n;

>

1 implies

f

n2 > 1 - f.

~s1-

increases, the increase in the relative price of non-traded goods is able
to preserve po~tfolio balance, given asset supplies and expectations.

The

portfolio balance schedule is shifted up by an increase in the stock of
foreign assets and down by an increase in the expected rate of depreciation
or in the money stock.
The slope of the portfolio balance locus would be vertical if
relative prices would not enter the asset demand ftmctions. As we
pointed out, if they do enter, the elasticities should be smaller than
in the non-traded goods sector.

In figure 8 we show first the effects of

an increase in the expected rate of an increase in the expected rate of
depreciation as a downward shift of PB which depreciates the black market
rate from P to P and increases the price of the non traded good from
0
1
q to q , since the NT schedule does not move. If the. slope was steeper
1
0
an increase in~

wollld bring about an appreciation and a decrease in the

price of the non-traded good.

The effect of an increase in the money stock

reveals that the latter case is unstable.

When

M increases PB

0

shifts to

If the NT

schedule were steeper the effect would be a reduction in

q which would

increase excess demand further and an appreciation of p which would decrease
the demand for M.
Substituting (6) and (1) in the total differential of the Br and Bu
equations, and defining as before the positive semi-elasticities

w ,w ,

w,

w , w2 an~ w for Br and Bu respectively, adding the positive

1
1 2
elasticities

we can write

q ,q and q for M, F and wand similarly for the p function,
1 2
3
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Figure 8
Temporary Equilibrium Effect of an Increase in K
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'

and

If the terms in brackets are positive the reduced form of Br and
B is exactly the same as in the model of section 3.
u
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